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Almost 50 years ago, John Dunlop (1957) noted that 
wages vary extensively among firms for workers in 
narrowly defined occupations in particular geographic 
regions. Dunlop suggested that a variety of factors-
product market conditions and social norms among 
them-might playa role in wage-setting, in addition 
to the supply and demand for different types of labor. 
Careful work with micro-data, in both developed and 
developing countries, has since provided further evidence 
for Dunlop's observation. Some industries pay more than 
others across occupational categories, controlling for the 
observed characteristics of workers.! More recent studies 
using matched employer-employee data have found a 
similar result for individual firms (Abowd, Kramarz, and 
Margolis 1999). Another persistent empirical regularity 
is that large firms pay more than small ones, even within 
narrowly defined industries and regions.2 
Despite these studies and an outpouring of work, 
both theoretical and empirical, on what might broadly 
be referred to as employment relationships, we still can 
say little with confidence about the causal role offactors 
beyond labor supply and demand in wage-setting. Studies 
have documented correlations between high wages and 
high productivity (Cappelli and Chauvin 1991; Levine 
1992; Wadhwani and Wall 1991), advanced technology 
(Krueger 1993; Doms, Dunne, and Troske 1997), and 
positive employee attitudes (Akerlof, Rose, and Yellen 
1988; Levine 1993a; Lincoln and Kalleberg 1990), but 
such correlations are consistent with a variety of causal 
mechanisms. To estimate a causal effect, we need both to 
find a source of exogenous variation in a variable that we 
believe affects wage-setting and to isolate a control group 
against which the affected firms or workplaces can be 
compared, in a dataset large enough to permit statistical 
inference. 
The two chapters of this dissertation pursue a common 
approach to this problem: to find a source of credibly 
exogenous changes in market conditions external to a 
set of workplaces and to examine the influence ofthose 
changes on wage-setting within the set of workplaces. 
In Chapter 2, the workplaces are plants in the Mexican 
manufacturing sector and the exogenous variation is 
generated by the shock to product market conditions 
brought about by the peso crisis of late 1994. In Chapter 
3, the workplaces are distribution terminals of a large, 
unionized U.S. trucking firm, and the exogenous variation 
is generated by fluctuations in the rate of unemployment 
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and wage levels for comparable workers in the local labor 
markets outside of each tenninal. 
Chapter 2: Trade, Quality Upgrading, and Wage 
Inequality in the Mexican Manufacturing Sector 
After a brief introductory chapter, the argument is 
presented in three sections. Section 2.1 investigates 
the response of the Mexican manufacturing sector to 
the exchange rate shock through a case study of one 
particularly important plant, the Volkswagen plant in 
Puebla, Mexico. The devaluation of the peso, together 
with the contraction of the domestic economy that 
followed, led the plant to expand exports and cut domestic 
production. Because cars sold in the United States were 
largely high-quality models-the Jetta, the Golf, and 
later the New Beetle-and cars sold on the domestic 
market were mainly a lower-quality model-the original 
Beetle-the increase in the share of exports resulted in an 
increase in the average quality of car produced. This shift 
in tum appears to have entailed changes in average wages 
for both blue-collar and white-collar employees, since 
the more automated and technologically sophisticated 
production process for the higher-quality models 
requires more highly skilled workers across occupational 
categories. 
Section 2.2 presents a new theoretical model that 
spells out why we might expect the change in product 
market conditions brought about by an exchange rate 
shock to have an impact on wage decisions within fums. 
In the model, fums are heterogeneous in an underlying 
productivity parameter that can be interpreted as technical 
lmow-how or entrepreneurial ability, and goods are 
differentiated in quality. In a developing country like 
Mexico, only the most productive films within each 
industry enter the export market, and they produce a 
better-quality good for expOlt than for the domestic 
market in order to appeal to richer developed-country 
consumers. Producing high-quality goods in tum requires 
paying high wages to both white-collar and blue-collar 
employees, but especially to white-collar employees. An 
increase in the incentive to export leads to differential 
quality upgrading within industries: initially more-
productive firms increase exports and shift toward 
greater production of higher-quality goods; initially less-
productive firms remain solely in the domestic market and 
undeltake no such upgrading. This process leads initially 
more-productive firms to raise wages across occupational 
categories, to raise the relative wage of white-collar 
workers, and to increase capital intensity relative to 
initially less-productive firms within the same industry. 
Section 2.3 tests the causal implications of the model 
using a newly constructed panel dataset on Mexican 
manufacturing plants. I find robust evidence that during 
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the years of the crisis (1993-1997) initially more-
productive plants increased both white-collar and blue-
collar wages, increased the relative wage of white-collar 
workers, and increased the capital-labor ratio to a greater 
extent than initially less-productive plants. Using an 
auxiliary dataset, I also find that over the 1994-1998 
period initially more-productive plants were more 
likely to acquire ISO 9000 certification, an international 
production standard commonly associated with high 
product quality. As a further test, I reestimate the same 
model on periods before and after the peso crisis during 
which a currency devaluation did not intervene. I find 
essentially no evidence of quality upgrading in the 1989-
1993 or the 1997-2001 periods. The only years in which I 
find similar (but weaker) results are 1986-1989, a period 
itself characterized by a significant depreciation ofthe 
peso. The empilical results thus provide strong support for 
the argument that changes in product market conditions-
in particular, in the relative demand for goods of different 
quality-can have an important impact on wage-setting. 
In formalizing the mechani§m of differential quality 
upgrading, the model draws-on four elements from 
the existing theoretical literature. The first element is 
monopolistic competition with heterogeneous producers, 
in the spirit of Melitz's (2003) extension of the seminal 
papers by Krugman (1979, 1980). The second element is a 
micro-founded form of differentiation in product quality, 
drawn from Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse's (1992) 
extension of the discrete-choice theory of McFadden 
(1978, 1981). The third element is an asymmetry in 
consumer demand between two countries, called North 
and South. In particular, consumers in North are assumed 
to be licher and hence more willing to pay for quality 
than consumers in South, an idea that dates back at 
least to Linder (1961). The fourth element is an O-ring 
production function from Kremer (1993) and Kremer and 
Maskin (1996) in which the production of high-quality 
goods requires highly skilled workers across occupational 
categories and is more sensitive to the skill of white-collar 
workers than to that of blue-collar workers. The main 
contribution of the model is to synthesize these previously 
separate ideas and to arrive at a new mechanism through 
which trade-related shocks may affect outcomes at the 
plant level: shifts in the within-plant product mix among 
goods of different qualities destined for different markets. 
The empirical part of the chapter is related to a 
growing empirical literature on international trade and 
the behavior of individual plants. Studies in this literature 
have tended to find little evidence of within-plant changes 
in behavior in response to exposure to international 
markets. An emerging consensus in the literature on trade 
and productivity is that trade raises aggregate productivity 
by shifting production toward more-productive plants 
rather than by improving productivity within plants 
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(Clerides, Lach, and Tybout 1998; Bernard and Jensen 
1999). Studies that have examined the effects of industry-
level changes in trade policy on plant-level changes in 
wage and employment decisions have found what many 
observers have described as puzzlingly small effects-in 
some cases despite large changes in tariffs or other trade 
policy measures. 3 In contrast, this chapter finds robust 
effects of a shock to the incentive to export on within-
plant behavior. The strength of the results may be due to 
two advantages of using an exchange rate shock, rather 
than changes in trade policy, as the source of exogenous 
variation. First, unlike most changes in trade policy, the 
shock was largely unexpected. Second, the shock was 
big. The peso lost approximately half of its value in a 
matter of days at the end of 1994, a change that dwarfs 
average tariff changes under NAFTA.4 The challenge 
in making use of an exchange-rate shock is to identify 
a source of variation in its impact at the plant level. A 
main empirical contribution of this chapter is to show 
how to use the interaction of the exchange-rate shock and 
preexisting heterogeneity within industries to identify the 
heterogeneous effects of the shock at the plant level. 
The chapter argues that differential quality upgrading 
within industries may be part of the answer to an 
important puzzle in the literature on trade and wages 
in developing countries: why has trade liberalization 
in many developing countries, including Mexico, been 
accompanied by rising wage inequality? The simplest 
Hecksher-Ohlin model of international trade predicts 
precisely the opposite effect: a developing country like 
Mexico, when integrating with a rich country like the 
United States, should specialize in activities intensive in 
unskilled labor, thereby raising the demand for unskilled 
labor and reducing wage inequality. More sophisticated 
Hecksher-Ohlin-type models can explain rising inequality 
in a country like Mexico, but only if production shifts 
toward skill-intensive sectors. In fact, employment growth 
in Mexico has been fastest in the least skill-intensive 
and capital-intensive industries, consistent with the 
simplest Hecksher-Ohlin model. The apparent inability 
ofHecksher-Ohlin-type theories to explain rising wage 
inequality has led many observers to conclude that it must 
be due to factors unrelated to trade, for instance to skill-
biased technical change. Differential quality upgrading 
represents an alternative mechanism through which trade 
may raise wage inequality in developing countries, and 
presents an example of how understanding the role of 
product market conditions in wage-setting may shed light 
on issues of more general policy relevance. 
Chapter 3: Fairness and Freight-Handlers 
Chapter 3 draws on evidence from an internal attitude 
survey of freight-handlers in a large, unionized U.S. 
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trucking firm to investigate the role of external labor 
market conditions as a reference point for employee 
fairness judgments.5 We have data from 29 geographically 
dispersed freight-handling telminals, compiled yearly 
over the period 1996-2000. The key element of the 
research design is that wages at each terminal are 
determined in collective bargaining at a national and 
regional level, and local managers have no discretion 
to vary wage rates in response to local labor market 
conditions. As a result, economic shocks in the local area 
generate exogenous variation in the attractiveness of the 
wage paid by the film relative to employees' options in 
the outside labor market. We relate this variation in the 
relative wage to employees' perceptions of the fairness of 
their wage and to their performance, as measured by the 
rate of disciplinary dismissals. 
After an introduction (Section 3.0) and a description 
of the institutional characteristics of the firm and the 
dataset (Section 3.1), Section 3.2 presents the indicators 
of outside labor market conditions. The first indicator 
is the local unemployment rate. The second indicator is 
a measure of the wage in the outside labor market for 
workers with similar observable characteristics from 
the Current Population Survey (CPS), calculated in two 
different ways. Sections 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 present the 
empirical results. The strongest results are for the effect of 
external labor market conditions on employee perceptions 
of wage fairness. The results indicate a robust, statistically 
and economically significant association between the rate 
of unemployment in the local labor market and the extent 
to which employees consider their wage to be fair, which 
we argue can be given a causal interpretation. We find an 
analogous effect of the wages of similar workers in the 
outside labor market on fairness perceptions. These results 
stand in contrast to studies based on surveys of managers 
(Bewley 1999,2002; Levine 1993b), which suggest that 
many managers do not consider external conditions to be 
important determinants of their employees' wage-fairness 
judgments. 
The results provide modest support for the 
reduced-form proposition that an increase in the local 
unemployment rate improves employee performance, 
as measured by the rate of disciplinary dismissals, when 
controlling for terminal fixed effects. Although the 
estimates are not robust in the strictest specification, 
they constitute stronger evidence for the central claim 
of efficiency-wage theories than perhaps the most 
convincing previous study, Cappelli and Chauvin (1991), 
which is based on cross-sectional variation across 
workplaces. In order for the local unemployment rate 
and the outside wage to be valid instruments for fairness 
perceptions, it must be the case that they affect employee 
performance only through their effect on employee 
fairness perceptions. Under this assumption, the results 
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also provide modest support for the hypothesis that 
improvements in wage-fairness perceptions generate 
improvements in employee perfonnance. 
Because local managers have no discretion to adjust 
wages, the chapter presents no direct evidence on wage-
setting behavior, but it does present evidence about why 
we might expect managers to take local labor market 
conditions-beyond their effect on supply and demand for 
labor-into account if they did have such discretion. The 
chapter also suggests by extension that fairness concerns 
may be important for aggregate labor market phenomena 
such as unemployment and the adjustment of wages and 
employment levels to aggregate shocks. 
Notes 
l. See Krueger and Sunnners (1986) and Katz and Summers 
(1989) for the United States, Moll (1993) for similar results 
in a developing country context. 
2. See Brown and Medoff (l 989) for the United States, 
Schaffner (1998) and Ve1enchik (1997) for developing 
countries. 
3. See Levinsohn (1999), Currie and Harrison (1997), and 
Harrison and Hanson (1999). 
4. This is especially impoliant if we are interested in shocks to 
the incentive to export to a rich country. Tariff reductions by 
developed countries are typically small, in part because their 
tariffs tend already to be low. 
5. This chapter is based on a joint work with Stephen V. Burks 
and J effrcy P. Carpenter. 
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